Bribery game in government secondary schools in Cameroon: An empirical investigation of Banfield’s model

Siméon Maxime BIKOUE, Oscar Victor BAYEMI

Abstract


Abstract. This paper analyzes the influence of bribery on the evaluation of students at the entrance and at the outlet of Government Secondary Schools (GSS) in Cameroon using the BANFIELD’s model. The empirical evidence reveals that there is bribery at the entrance and at the outlet in GSS. So, students can be registered or pass an exam thanks to “gombo”. The couples (student, teacher) and (student, secretary), respectively at the entrance and the outlet, are corrupt at a significant threshold of 5% and a P-value of 0%. In the first case corruption highlights that students are victims of adverse- selection and the principal of the school is victim of moral hazard. In the second, it suggests that the principal is not only victim of moral risk but also of adverse selection.

Keywords. Bribery, Government secondary schools, Banfield’s model, Adverse selection, Moral hazard.

JEL. B52, F55, O17, O31, O33, O35, O43, P10, P14, P48.


Keywords


Bribery; Government secondary schools; Banfield’s model; Adverse selection; Moral hazard.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jest.v7i3.2097

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