Why return to an electoral authoritarian state?

Takaharu ISHII

Abstract


Abstract. This study provides theoretical conditions for a stable political system. This study has the trade-off that military support for the rulers simultaneously encourages military build-up, resulting in closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism and stabilising military regimes, while at the same time giving the military a stronger voice, which is a cost for the rulers. Democracies that are not aligned with the military are shown to be unstable. Despite the assumption of a path-dependent model, electoral authoritarianism is a stable system in countries where the initial political system is strengthened, but where the balance between citizens and the military is struck and the amount of real resources is not sufficient for the number of resources demanded by the citizens.

Keywords. Path dependency; Democracy; Electoral authoritarian; Closed authoritarian; Military.

JEL. P16; P26; P48.

Keywords


Path dependency; Democracy; Electoral authoritarian; Closed authoritarian; Military.

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jsas.v9i2.2314

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