Principle-Agent Analysis of Technology Project (LINCOS) in Costa Rica

By Dawood MAMOON & Silvia HERNANDEZ

Abstract. In this paper we analyze the institutional arrangement between various actors to understand how ICT project objectives flow among actors in a standard LINCOS project and how they would affect the sustainability and effectiveness of LINCOS in particular and an ICT project in general. Since there are many actors involved in different stages and processes of a single LINCOS project, the paper analyses the bilateral and multilateral relationships among these actors to understand the factors that might affect the efficiency of the ICT project. In other words the paper looks at the actors involved in a LINCOS project in an effort to capture those circumstances under which a LINCOS project is exposed to principal-agent problems.

Keywords. Technology, Game theory, Project Evaluation.

JEL. C70, N70, N75.

1. Introduction

Today, when the technological revolution is transforming the lives of those who are connected to it, the issue of access to information technology is becoming increasingly relevant in every part of the world. Thus it is indispensable for a country to be prepared for such changes (Human Development Report, 2001). Costa Rica is one of the smaller Latin American countries, inhabited by only 4 million people. However, it is one of the more developed Latin American nations, known for its social and cultural homogeneity, political stability and democratic traditions. It is also one of the few countries in the world that does not have an army and instead, since 1949, successive governments have channeled public resources to the improvement of general public welfare rather than using them on amassing weaponry. Thus it is not a surprise that today Costa Rica is one of the more developed countries among its regional counterparts, with superior social and human development indicators (refer to Table 1) that it is definitely a fine example to follow (Garnier 1998; Human Development Report, 2001).

Table 1. Indicators of the Evolution of Social Development in Costa Rica 1940-2000

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult Illiteracy (% of population older than 15 years old)</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education (for more than 25 years old)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy (years)</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>77.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (1000 births)</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (%)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>79.7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.a.: Not available. Source: Garnier et al., 1998; *Estado de la Nación, 2004.

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In the technology sphere, the country has also achieved positive technology introductions as suggested in the 2001 Human Development Report; Costa Rica has developed its human capital to utilize these new technologies efficiently. In effect, as the Human Development Index shows, the country had shifted from a medium human development level to a high one of almost 80% in the year 2000. For the same year, the illiteracy rate was merely 4 percentage points (Garnier et al., 1998; Estado de la Nación, 2004) indicating an educated environment, and this has boosted the use of ‘new’ technologies.

Irrespective of these overall national achievements apropos economic development, one is confronted with a different reality when inter-regional differences are taken into account because significant inequalities prevail between urban and rural areas of Costa Rica.

### Table 2. Percentage of School Attendance for the Population over 5 years, per Region and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Urban Region</th>
<th>Rural Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-6 years old</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>64.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-12 years old</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-19 years old</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years old</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 years old and more</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Population Census 2000, INEC

For example, Table 2 shows that, out of the rural population aged between 25 and 49, more than two thirds barely have 6 years of schooling, whereas in urban areas the corresponding figure is less than one third. One of major reasons for this situation is the fact that people do not have enough financial resources to afford education (refer to Graph 1) (Estado de la Nación, 2000:87). One way to make education accessible to the rural poor is to make it cheaper and efficient by utilizing ‘new’ technologies.

### Graph 1. Various Causes of Non-School Attendance of the Population between 5 and 17 years of age

**Source:** Households surveys, INEC, 2000.

There is a greater need of technologies that can provide access to information, especially in the rural areas, and to reduce the digital divide. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can be identified as such technologies which, under the right conditions (for example, effective use of it and equal access to it), can not only improve the skills of the targeted population through better knowledge but also enable them to have better income opportunities (Schech 2002; Rodriguez 2001; Colle 2000; Escobar 1995). However, rural areas generally lack easy access to these Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) because of complex conditions. For example, because of their remote geographical locations most rural areas have poor infrastructure, which makes it difficult for the availability of ICTs (Okot-Uma, 1992 cited by Ghimire, 1997). Therefore ICT provision to rural areas
is generally a challenge and a tough task. But it is necessary to take up this challenge because ICTs are cheaper and efficient modes of knowledge dissemination, and this is a pre-requisite for the improvement in rural livelihoods.

Yet, the provision of ICTs generally involves many actors and as a result quite many processes. These actors can be the State, a Northern NGO, a Southern NGO or both and/or local communities, and these actors interact with each other at various stages of a standard ICT project. In an effort to identify the most efficient ways of ICT provision, one has to critically evaluate the role of these actors individually and/or in a group. For example, it is imperative to know how different intermediaries’ as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) come into action to play a role in the transfer of technology by implementing ICT projects that can facilitate the access to various technology tools in areas where technology introduction is difficult (Colle, 2000).

This paper intends to look at one such intermediary NGO in Costa Rica, namely the Costa Rican Foundation for Sustainable Development (CRFSD). This Foundation is an idea of the former president of Costa Rica, Jose Maria Figueres Olsen who initiated an ICT project called ‘the Little Intelligent Communities’ (LINCOS). CRFSD has also involved various national and international aid agencies/donors in the promotion of its project.

As a result, the CRFSD has to go through different steps before each LINCOS project is finally implemented and considered ready for its use by the targeted population. These steps form the project chain, which covers all the processes that a project has to deal with, making up for the complete institutional arrangement whereby different relationships and interests are covered and roles of different actors involved are identified.

The major focus of the study is to identify relationships between the various actors involved in a standard LINCOS project and the way in which those relationships may have influenced the efficiency of the project by looking at all the actors involved and the course of actions taken by them.

There are ‘hard’ factors or material infrastructure requirements (e.g. components of electricity, hardware and software platforms) to provide access to ICTs, and there is also a need for the so-called ‘soft’ infrastructure (e.g. financial and negotiation factors) to support the diffusion and the use of these technologies (Chepaitis, 2002). This paper centers its attention on the soft factors, which construct the institutional arrangement and, in particular, it examines the relationship between the different actors involved in the ICT project.

For a better understanding, a graphic representation of the ICT project chain is presented in figure 1 in appendix A. The chain provides a general overview of different actors and processes involved in every step of the ICT project. Following the steps identified in this ICT project chain, the paper attempts to show if the different actors are meeting the project’s objectives and if they all have same objectives. This will also provide us with the information to know how every step has defined the actual purpose of the project, even though the purpose may be officially the same.

In this chain analysis, the paper seeks to identify the role played by the actors, giving special emphasis to the NGO (CRFSD) and its relationships with the donors’, State’ and with the LINCOS’ management membership based organization (MBO). To this end, we can consider the positive connotations and different problems that arise from different actors’ interventions. Such an approach will help me to identify if some actors can lead to the creation of new relationships of dependency, where some of them may have more power to take decisions and impose conditionality on the others.

Since it is anticipated that (as it is the case now) the majority of the world’s rural population will not own ICTs in the near future and most will probably not be direct users of ICTs - many countries are trying to reverse such trends. ICTs are identified as an important means of sustainable development and efficiency in communities - be they rural or urban.
To this effect, in many developing countries, a wide range of organizations—national and international—are promoting and supporting the creation of entities that can make ICTs available on an affordable basis to everyone. Much of this attention is now on “NGOs and their initiatives toward applying ICTs and telecenters toward development” (Colle, 2000:4).

In this paper, evaluation of the CRFSD as one of those intermediary entities, and the analysis of its ICT project is used to understand what steps are involved in a project before people get access to it. As mentioned earlier, an ICT project entails a chain of different steps and actors before its outputs reach recipients. The analysis of any such steps that allow the information to flow from a ‘top’ initiative idea to the ‘bottom’-to hitherto disconnected people-provides a useful framework for any efficient ICT project implementation. Such an approach gives an understanding of the processes that may delay or accelerate the ICT connectivity to the rural people.

In short, ICT projects are worth analyzing to understand the institutional arrangement that lies behind them, especially since the analysis of such partnerships and relationships in ICT projects have not been covered extensively by the existing literature (Brehm, 2001).

It was possible for me to gather good background knowledge about my case study as I have been working with the CFRSD. It has been both a challenge and a moving learning exercise to explore the relationships between the NGO and the donors, the state and the community management based organization (MBO) as actors involved in LINCOS.

The objectives of this study are to:

a) Identify those steps in the structure of the project that may delay or accelerate the access of information to the targeted population;

b) Analyze the NGO objectives in relation to those of its partners, donors, State and the community organization (MBO) involved. (Does everybody want the same thing? Do objectives of the NGO clash with those of the donors and do these differences influence the objectives of the NGO? How are actors influencing the project?)

This research seeks to examine some of the factors that may inhibit or foster access to ICTs. There will be a further focus on other specific sub-questions:

a) How do objectives of the ICT project flow among the actors and why? (What happens at the end of this process?)

b) What factors in the institutional arrangement account for the delay or progress of the ICT project and why? (How long does it take, what does it mean in terms of time and why? i.e. contract agreements, requirements, etc)

c) Are changes in the project, if any, caused because the presence or absence of particular actor/s (i.e., donors/state)?

2. Methodology

This study is based mainly on secondary data to illustrate the case of the steps involved behind an ICT project and its analysis with a principal-agent perspective. Principal-agent theory is chosen because it can identify different relationships among actors involved (Stiglitz, 1998). Whereas, the role of these actors may depend on who sets up the rules and which one is willing to accept them. As a result, sometimes the interests of a principal (the donors) can influence the interests/objectives of the agent (NGOs). This is because there may be uneven situations of information from one actor to the other (Stiglitz, 1998). It is therefore important to look at the objectives of the project to understand if they match with the interests of the particular actors involved.

Principal-agent theory also helps to understand the role of each actor, shedding light on the reasons why their objectives are similar or different. There can also be the case (depending on the circumstances) that an actor that is playing the role of a principal becomes the agent for another actor and similarly the agent becomes the principal for another actor. Such a situation will most probably arise while moving down to another stage on the ICT chain. In short, by using principal-agent
methodology, the paper tries to analyze whether the original objective of any ICT project changes because of the actions taken by different actors in different stages. The secondary data for the analysis has been collected through literature review from websites and library materials in the Netherlands. The case study was assessed on the basis of published and unpublished reports, articles, and other material from the studied NGO. Also, some primary data was gathered by interviews and email communications with the main actors involved in the project, by arranged contact from the NGO.

Since the study concentrates on the soft structure of information access of an ICT project, it does not look at the impact of this project in the communities. Therefore, the paper does not pay major attention to the positions of the communities or the beneficiaries’ reaction and the way they will make use of the information and communication technologies. Rather, it focuses on the ways in which these ICT services are provided to the people that need the information in the shortest possible time that facilitates the service delivery. Looking at the way actors operate will assess this service delivery. Therefore, this research will also be of help for anyone interested in the role of the actors behind any NGO project.

Since this work is based mainly on secondary data with the use of the CRFSD project files, it is imperative to acknowledge that I myself did not participate in the process of the material creation, which may lead me to diverse conclusion problems. Also, there is always the possibility of not having access to some information, even though all the previous negotiation was carried out. The key concepts of the study are: Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) -as the ICTs performer of the presented case- and their relationships with Donors, State, and MBOs. This is evaluated with a Principal-Agent Theory Analysis.

3. Defining information and communication technologies (ICTs) through literature

“ICT encompasses all those technologies that enable the handling of information and facilitate different forms of communication among human actors, between human beings and electronic systems, and among electronic systems” (Hamelink, 1997:3). This technology ‘reflects the convergence of digital computing and telecommunications’ (Heeks, 2002:1), which are the means to serve the goals of the information handling and communication. Different ‘old’ and ‘new’ devices for the information delivery such as computer, radio, and telephones among others, can hold the use of this technology.

It is widely believed that ICTs are a means to enhance people’s well-being (Heeks, 2002; Schech, 2002; Colombo, 1989). This public welfare is achieved through knowledge sharing that enables people to improve their skills as a means for empowerment. This empowerment extends opportunities for employment, which will improve their life conditions. Evidence indicates that ‘ICTs can be highly beneficial to individual communities, projects and countries as under the right circumstances ICTs can improve education, health, job creation, governance and other services’ (Rodriguez, 2000:5).

However, merely acknowledging that information can provide many opportunities for those who need it is not enough. This information should be provided as effectively as possible. There is the belief that for an effective usage of ICTs, the question of digital divide has to be addressed by incurring extensive investment in the ICT infrastructure. The second critical step is to shift from learning to ‘learning-to-learn’, as in the age of modern ICTs, most information is on-line, and what is really required is the skill to know what to look for, how to retrieve it, how to process it and how to use it, thus transforming information into knowledge and knowledge into action (Castells, 2001). Only after such actions, which lead to the provision and optimal utilization of ICTs, can it be said that information technology causes social well-being.

Yet, this involves many underlying assumptions. The most vulnerable set of assumptions for ICTs to provide benefits for all people, especially the needy ones, is that the information technology should not only be equally available to the people from all the stratum of income, but that they are also well capable of utilizing it. These assumptions do not hold in reality. Firstly, there is an enormous and augmenting partition between the have and have not of ICT infrastructure. As Saith so aptly states:

“The empirical evidence, revised as it is continuously in order to keep track of a fast moving target, all confirm the existence of a chiasmic divide: this applies to the different elements of ICTs; and then for comparisons between continental regions; within advanced and poor economies; within each country to the enormous gaps between rural and urban populations; within urban regions to wide divide between the megapolitan centres and large cities on the one hand and the small towns on the other; within cities to the different categories of suburbs that house different social groups” (2001:4).

Thus, there is a clear case of digital divide between and within countries and where variations of the wealth distribution are noticeably from rural to urban, which hampers the effectiveness of ICTs (Castells, 2001; Colle, 2000).

Additionally, illiteracy problems and social discrimination prevailing in societies limit the use of ICTs even where they are made accessible to a common person: ‘Since ICT skills are largely based on literacy, it seems that the vast majority of the illiterate population which are largely poor will be excluded from the emerging knowledge societies, whereas the worse shall be women who constitute the major chunk of illiterates in the world’ (Hamelink, 2000).

Here then, the question that arises is why there is still a profound gap between technology needs and availability in rural areas? How can ICTs fill the gap in those deficit areas? These questions lead to a major concern with who is implementing ICTs and in what way it is implemented? Since it may be the case that, despite good intentions regarding a project, some actors are not playing properly their role.

To this effect, in order to examine the ways in which ICTs can be delivered to people, one has to look at the role of the different intermediaries that play a crucial role in its service delivery strategy. These intermediaries can be broadly identified as NGOs, Donors and the State. Before analyzing the role of these actors in ICT development, it is useful to first understand their general role in the social and economic development of a country and also how these actors are linked with each other in an institutional framework for the promotion and implementation of a development project.

3.1. What are non-governmental organizations (NGOs)?

According to many authors, NGOs have become important actors in the last decades (Biekart, 1999; Edwards & Fowler 2002; Carroll, 1992; Korten, 1990; Padrón, 1982, Macdonald, 1997; Smillie, 1995; Thomas & Allen 2000) serving as intermediaries for donor agencies and governments by having a strong presence in needy communities around the world.

It is important when analyzing NGOs to understand how accountable they can be to the people they are helping. However, a critical definition of NGOs and their distinctions must be presented first.

It is difficult to find an adequate definition of NGOs. They embrace also many different organizations ranging from “political action committees to sport clubs” (Carroll, 1992).

Therefore, a special distinction of NGOs is made between those organizations performing developmental assistance and those involved with social commitment in “grassroots work”. The former are grassroots support organizations (GSO), which are NGOs providing assistance to different communities as intermediary agencies (Carroll, 1992). For some authors, these organizations are also known as non-governmental development organizations (NGDO), which are also within the NGOs category but with an attitude more towards development (Padrón, 1982).
Grassroots organizations (GRO) on the other hand are NGOs that are not working at the supra regional level as GSO. They are only concerned with their own community assistance, thus seen as community organizations (Arrosi et al. 1999) or ‘peoples’ organizations’ (Korten, 1990). Within these GROs there are grassroots based organizations (GBOs) and membership organizations (MO) (i.e. member based organizations (MBOs), whereas the main differences between this group and the GSO lies in the way they gain their support and their accountability structures. GRO followers also call them self-help groups, since they are entities that gather their results by making use of their own resources and by assisting their own organization or community. Arrosi et al. define self-help as the following:

…any action undertaken by an individual or group of persons, which aims at the satisfaction of individual or collective needs or aspirations. The distinctive feature of a self-help initiative or activity is the substantial contribution made from the individual’s or group’s own resources in terms of labor, capital, land and /or entrepreneurial skills…. a self-help group is also a membership organization which implies that its risk, costs and benefits are shared among its members on an equitable basis and that its leadership and /or manager liable to be called to account by membership for their deeds’ (1994:45).

There are a wide variety of classifications according to the nature of entity; NGOs can also be grouped as northern non-governmental organization (NNGO) or southern non-governmental organization (SNGO) depending on their headquarters’ location or from where the assistance is coming from (Bebbington & Farrington 1991 in Bebbington et al. 1993).

Furthermore as the term indicates, non-governmental organizations are not entities from government, though in reality many NGOs receive funds mainly from them (Thomas & Allen, 2000). They become contractors and not independent actors, since most are not financially self-sufficient but in need of resources. The same situation is seen with donors and NGO relationships. NGOs have been acting as intermediaries in developing countries where government or donor funds are available, becoming implementing agencies for big donors in the aid chain (Biekart, 1999).

Apart from understanding the typology of NGOs, an evaluation of their work should be offered since there are many examples that can be attributed as positive and negative effects from the work of NGOs.

NGOs aim to alleviate problems present in the majority of developing countries, especially in rural development (OECD, 1998). Even though these problems can be attributed to different circumstances, NGOs have developed different networks to improve any existing situation. Today, their work is concentrated in the help they can provide to community development. This assistance can be direct or indirect by providing resources that were lost by natural disasters or by the introduction and implementation of projects to impact a large range number of people. Also, communities are relying on them to gain access to resources because of the lobbying capacity that many NGOs have, (Riddell & Robinson 1995).

However, in the majority of cases these NGOs’ projects are pre-designed and implemented in the same way all throughout communities. This is because in some cases NGOs act as intermediaries to northern organizations or donors that want to utilize the same project models in south countries. Hence, the project may not have positive impacts (such as local ownership) because of different characteristics and necessities of the place where it will be implemented as compare with the one where it was first set. As a result, different situations such as cultural and political factors can show the disapproval of some NGOs’ work (Rozendal, 2003). Besides, many times project developers are not considering other aspects such as remunerations schemes, which have negative aspects when leaving apart. As Riddell and Robinson suggests “well-trained field staff, motivated by a reasonable level of remuneration and committed to the goals of the organization, clearly play a critical role in successful interventions… poorly paid staff have cause to be less committed to the projects they are managing or executing, and will be tempted to
spend more project time engaged in moonlighting activities” (1995:71). Finally and in contrast, projects should not leave behind the idea that “too many staff will have objectives that are too broad and shallow” (Heeks & Baark, 1998:26).

Consequently, for a better perception there should also be an assessment on NGOs accountability. Here, the question is to whom NGOs are accountable? Are they accountable to their partners, to the communities they target, to donors, to governments, or to the coordination bodies in which they participate? To some extent they are accountable to all of them, but the unequal power relations they engage in must be acknowledged (Carusi, 2003:11). As Thomas & Allen have stated, “NGOs are in practice more accountable to their donors than they are to the beneficiaries” (2000:213). Biekart (1999) also argues that in the aid chain the most powerful actors are donors (i.e. northern governments) at the top of the aid chain and they control strategic decisions in the negotiation process.

INTRAC work describes this accountability issue by pointing out their concerns for the way in which, some local NGOs are being held accountable by communities:

“After initial enthusiasm for supporting local NGOs as intermediaries to empower the popular organizations of Civil Society, questions are now being asked about their accountability to these organizations. Might they even weaken Civil Society? Have we witnessed a disproportionate support for local NGOs at the expense of popular organizations… making the latter dependent on local NGOs as intermediaries for access to resources? Local NGOs increasingly tend to present popular organizations in policy discussions with donors and, in turn, have attached a professional middle-class cadre of ‘experts’. By funding and promoting local NGOs, are we in danger not only of encouraging opportunism but also of undermining even the more productive role that government might play in developing countries?” (Bennett & Gibbs, 1996:4).

On the whole, NGOs’ ties to some actors may lead them to different priorities where the course of projects get changed or interrupted. Hence, this difference of priorities that may be present in the institutional arrangement is what calls for the analysis of the relationships among different actors.

3.2. NGOs, state and donors: An overview

After going through the above analysis, in this paper NGO refers to organizations that engage in providing support to different communities. Therefore, the Costa Rica Foundation for Sustainable Development (CRFSD) refers to a grassroots support organization (GSO) or Southern NGO (SNGO), and the LINCOS community administrative organization is referred to GRO, or MBO definition.

After the end of cold war, bilateral and multilateral lending agencies have pursued a so-called ‘New Policy Agenda’ that identifies NGOs such as GROs as one of the most prominent means for poverty alleviation, social welfare, democratization and healthy civil society. They are also considered to be key channels for the promotion of pluralism and human rights protection.

At the same time, the developing country states are viewed by these aid agencies as generally lacking resources or commitment to ensure universal coverage of social welfare for the public. Furthermore, the state failures are attributed to their interventionist policies. For example, in ‘rural development projects’, the tendency for state institutions to centralize decision-making led to growing classes of urban-based functionaries, hierarchical decision making and so reduced flexibility and responsiveness and to inappropriate and slow program implementation at local level (Ahmad, 2000:15). In short, there are state failures in many developing countries due to an inefficient allocation of resources at national level, and particularly to rural and urban sectors and private and public sectors. In view of the good history of NGOs in providing welfare services to the poor people in those countries where governments failed to ensure universal coverage in health,
education and security, the new liberal paradigm has scrapped the Keynesian model of development where the state and its agencies were assumed to be the key vehicles through which projects and policies were implemented.

Traditionally, donor finance has been channelled into various development projects through NNGOs. However, this trend is increasingly changing as the SNGOs’ competence and capacity is improving. Now, SNGOs increasingly receive funds from many different sources including NNGO partners, international foundations and official bilateral and multilateral donors, whereas donors also support SNGOs indirectly through NNGOs. The change of focus from NNGOs to SNGOs is also due to the fact that this arrangement suits both donors and the developing country state. Donors prefer SNGOs because they are assumed to be more accountable, better performers, and more effective in strengthening civil society in the South than their Northern counterparts (Bebbington & Riddell 1994).

In the case of NNGOs, the developing country state does not have much leverage to address these concerns and might consider their actions a threat to its legitimacy or sovereignty. Many NNGOs look to influence southern state policies through operational collaboration, lobbying and advocacy. On the other hand, a range of interventions can be used by the state to influence indigenous NGOs in the South. They can involve restrictive measures like investigation and coordination, deregistration or even closure or they can provide incentives like tax exemption status, access to policy makers and public funding (Hulme & Edwards 1997).

3.3. Conceptualizing institutional arrangement between NGOs, state, GRO/MBOs and donors

The role of NGOs in economic and social development cannot be understood without taking into account the nature of their relationship with other actors that participate in the non-governmental social development initiative. This paper identifies these actors as the developing country state, donors (including NNGOs), NGOs (including SNGOs or GSOs) and GROs (including MBOs).

Figure 2 below shows the direction of the relationship between these actors and the kind of control or influence each of them can have on others. First, it should be recognized that though actors may work together, their objectives can vary and that one actor might dominate any particular bilateral relationship. The objective of each actor can either be categorized as some officially stated goal like poverty alleviation and national economic development or there can be some hidden agenda like access to foreign markets or simply to influence another actor through persuasion, financial inducement or direct coercion (Hulme & Edwards, 1997).

3.4.1. NGO and donors relationship

For example, in the case of the NGO-donors relationship, the donor’s objective can vary according to its orientation. In the context of this paper, donors can be categorized into three groups: (a) private enterprises, (b) multilateral or bilateral aid agencies or foundations and (c) academic institutions. The objective of private enterprises can be to access the foreign market, whereas aid agencies and academic institutions would normally work for certain development goals identified in neo-
liberal economics. They collude to participate in NGO activity in the developing country by providing finance, technical assistance (i.e., exchange visits) or other material resources irrespective of differentiation in their goals (Hulme & Edwards, 1997:7-8; Riddell & Robinson, 1995:67).

3.4.2. NGO and state relationship

Here, donor initiatives force developing country states to participate in an NGO activity to ensure state legitimacy is not weakened. According to Farrington & Bebbington (1993), if anything, State and NGOs are ‘reluctant partners’. This seems to be the case in many countries, but in many instances the relationships are more complex and prone to extreme variations. For example, Bratton (1989) argues that African States have generally adopted a control-oriented approach towards NGOs. In Kenya, the State is more concerned with larger NGOs present in cities and undertaking urban programs whereas smaller NGOs working in remoter rural areas and are allowed to operate with a much higher degree of ‘autonomy’ as they do not threaten the state (Anangwe, 1995). Though in some other countries the state appears to be more flexible, this flexibility is due to the preferences of specific regimes (Perera & Wanigaratne cited by Hulme & Edwards 1997). So, State and NGO relationships are case sensitive and call for a more detailed case study analysis to understand how states envisage different NGOs.

3.4.3. NGO and GRO/MBO relationship

The basis of the NGO and GRO relationship comes with the choices NGOs face in project implementation. It is up to the NGO whether it wants to involve itself directly with individual households or to channel its programs through GROs, which make up for more efficient links to the poor. In the case of SNGOs in particular, the choice of GRO root matters more as historically their most preferred operational mode has been mobilizing community-based organizations (CBO) according to a standard format, which these SNGOs believe it optimal because “it facilitates mass outreach and helps reduce administrative costs” (Hulme & Edwards, 1997:15).

However, irrespective of their operational preferences for optimal outcomes, Hashemi (1995) believes that the only way for NGOs to be more relevant to the poor is if they become accountable to those for whose welfare they are working. This is quite contrasting with the general practice where NGOs are seen to be more accountable to their donors or for that matter, the state. In short, to be efficient, “NGOs have to make a choice; between the four wheel drive vehicle that comes with government licensing and donor funding, and the much harder conditions involved in living along side poor people” (Hashemi 1995, quoted by Hulme & Edwards 1997:15). To this effect, ‘the question whether [NGOs or to this matter SNGOs or GSOs] are concentrating on their linkages to states and donors to such degree that their relationships with the poor are being eroded remains the most critical one’. This question will form the basis of our analysis in and the paper will discuss the case of the SNGO under investigation ‘CRFSD’, which is also involved with other actors creating an institutional interdependence.

3.5. Principal-agent theory: The research method

Today principal-agent theory has seen practical application in nearly every area of social science. It captures the dynamics of a relationship between two entities, two individuals or two parties where one is recognized as an agent because he/she is expected to perform certain duties identified by his/her principal who is bound to keep part of the commitment towards the agent (Halachmi, 2003). For example, in the developing world, institutions like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be agents of autonomous funding institutions like the World Bank or IMF or public funding agencies like government banks or they can be agents of multinationals donors. In short, an agent is employed to act on behalf of another called his principal, so that as a rule the principal him/herself becomes bound.

However, there is a caveat: According to Halachmi (2003), it is impossible to observe all actions and decisions of the agent or to infer them by observing the...
outcomes of agent’s decision. This leads to a principal agent problem, which arises because of imperfect information constraints, either concerning what action the agent has undertaken or should undertake (Stiglitz, 1998).

3.5.1. Principal agent problems: Moral hazard and adverse selection

It is customary to distinguish two types of informational constraints in principal-agent theory: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to endogenous variables that are not observed by the principal. Stiglitz (1998) defines moral hazard crudely through credit relationships between lenders and borrowers. According to him, in credit relationships moral hazard arises when the actions of the borrower can affect the probability of default. Laffont and Tirole explain moral hazard as discretionary actions of actors (i.e., NGO) that affect the cost or quality of their project. These discretionary actions can be allocation of perks by the managers (hiring personnel to lighten their work loads, inattention to excessive inventories of inputs, etc), indulgence in activities that privilege their career potential over efficiency, purchase of materials and equipment at high prices are a few of the negative efforts arising from moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when an agent has more information about exogenous variables than the principal. In general adverse selection allows the agent to extract a rent from interaction with the principal even if his/her bargaining power is low. Laffont & Tirole (1993) explain that an actor (State, Donor or NGO) is faced by adverse selection when it is only known to the MBO or the community whether its cost for a given level of cost reducing activity is high or low. Since a regulator, who must ensure that the MBO supply certain services, must also guarantee that the MBO is willing to participate in implementation and execution of the project (even if it faces intrinsically high costs), the MBO must enjoy non-negative rent even if the project they are working in is inefficient. This leads to the possibility of adverse selection as the MBO could lower its cost-reducing activity below the socially optimal level and produce at a high cost that would have been its cost has it been inefficient. This slack provides the MBO with more utility that it would have had, had it been inefficient, and hence with a strictly positive rent.

4. Setting the scene: An ICT experience in Costa Rica

4.1. LINCOS - A project description

As discussed earlier, a series of initiatives related to the application of ICTs has been initiated in Costa Rica with the idea of introducing the use of communication technologies and making them accessible to the majority of people. As a result, CRFSD (also known as Entebbe© in partnership with Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Costa Rica Institute of Technology (ITCR) initiated the LINCOS program in 1998.

CRFSD was created as a non-profit organization, in 1993. Today, is mission is ‘to promote the use of technology applications that enhance peoples’ well-being, within a framework of Sustainable Development’ (CRFSD, 2004). LINCOS is a project meant primarily for the poorest marginal urban communities and rural areas, which, according to CRFSD, are the main locations that do not have access to technology platforms and other basic technology infrastructures (LINCOS [Multimedia] 2000). The LINCOS project involves the installation of a services unit, which works as a telecenter® with multiple applications available to its target beneficiaries that are children, adults, small and medium size farmer’s producers, local small business, medical patients among others, whereas in full operation LINCOS could service over 4,000 people per month. (LINCOS [Multimedia], 2000).

This LINCOS units’ structural design consists of a used shipping container - disposed of by a shipping company - that is about 20 feet long and 9 feet wide with a canopy added on top to provide shade and water protection. It is modified with doors and windows and normally configured with six computer stations and a small ‘laboratory’ inside (see appendix B for drawings). According to CRFSD, this
container box and its size were selected because of ‘its convenience, security, and portability,’ by minimizing the environmental impact and benefiting communities where it gets permanently installed (LINCOS, 2004). However, in 2003 CRFSD decided together with the Digital Nations Consortium to change their focus on containers by taking LINCOS to second-generation phase following a permanent evolution strategy whereby the project services can be placed if the community so wants by using: a community center, school (not necessarily recyclable containers) in an effort to focus mainly on community and educational aspects (LINCOS, 2004).

4.2. Project dimensions

Currently, the LINCOS project is no longer a pilot project and has already been introduced in two Latin American countries (Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic) with a total number of 18 units working in different rural communities. For example, three units have been set up in three different rural locations of Costa Rica, and the rest have been located since 2000 in 15 different rural communities of the Dominican Republic.

In the case of Costa Rica, LINCOS projects have been implemented through donor initiatives, while in Dominican Republic they have been implemented through the national government.

LINCOS units are capable of attending the needs of over 4,000 inhabitants per month, providing them various services. The following table gives the average capacity of a LINCOS unit for the various services it offers, per week, per month and/or per year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service Offered</th>
<th>Quantity of People Attended/Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational computers to girls and boys between the ages of 7 an 14</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Information Systems for people 15 years old and older</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab services use for Educational Information Systems</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Window and community services</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil and Water studies</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teleconferences</td>
<td>560 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per Unit</td>
<td>1,098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * It is estimated that the service can be offered to five persons per week; ** There is a 40 persons capacity for the video conferences, twice a day, seven days a week

Source: Lincos web site, [Retrieved from].

The Table shows that a standard LINCOS unit makes available various ICT-oriented services (banking, trade, local agriculture information, etc) to an average of 1,739 inhabitants per month, including school students as well as adult population living in or near the community where the project is introduced.

On average, LINCOS can also perform 20 soil and water studies per month, which can be utilized for myriad of purposes, i.e., early disease detection and sickness control or better agricultural practices. Last but not least, LINCOS also contain a teleconference and entertainment component which generally serve a group of 40 people, twice a day, seven days a week. This enhances cultural levels, creates ‘new’ forms of entertainment and help, giving the possibility of communicating with the world (CRFSD, 2004).

4.3. Steps and processes to deploy LINCOS units

Implementing this project, involves various steps that correspond to the execution of a LINCOS unit in a community. These steps and processes are the ones constructing the chain under analysis (see Figure 1, in Appendix A) and they are outlined as following in detail.

Step 1: Introduction of the Project

Process 1: Overall Assessment: LINCOS was the brainchild of CRFSD where the original objectives of the project were set up. When the idea was still on paper,
CRFSD initiated contacts with donors and government officials of the participant countries where the project was to be implemented. National evaluation/surveys were undertaken to establish economic, social, technological, cultural educational and environmental conditions. At this stage, every community that might potentially participate in the project was identified.

Process 2: Community Assessment and Selection: This activity involved evaluation/surveys to identify the communities where the LINCOS units could be fully integrated. Each community that could benefit from the project needed to fulfill a range of requirements and responsibilities. Once these requirements were met, CRFSD together with Rochester University would proceed with the elaboration of the community assessment or Rapid Assessment Process’ (RAP), carried out in participation with the different actors in the community, with the idea of creating a strategic and operative work plan for the project’s implementation. Thus, “each community will have access to only those applications (refer to appendix C, for application details) that are seen feasible for them, enabling every LINCOS project to have its distinct features depending on the community requirement and CFRSD and its actor’s assessment report” (LINCOSa [second-generation internal file] 2003).

**Step 2: Construction and Installation**

Process 3: LINCOS Unit Construction: As soon as the ‘Assessment and Community Selection’ takes place and the relevant social and economic studies are initiated, the construction of a LINCOS unit begins.

Process 4: Unit Transportation: Transportation will begin as soon as the first units are ready for shipping to their respective countries/regions. However, prior to transportation, there must be a guaranteed site selection that meets the criteria set in the original plans. Transportation includes packing and sea or land transportation, unit arrival, local transportation to the sites, final deployment on the selected site and the final tests.

Process 5: Community Selection of Administrative Organization and Site Preparedness: Here, an “administrative” member based organization (MBO) needs to be selected for the execution of the project as well as the coordinators working in different LINCOS’ applications by the community and the CRFSD with mutual consensus. This activity also involves the identification of sites where the units are to be installed for the selected communities. Besides this identification and preparation of the site, the construction of necessary infrastructure such as restroom facilities, telephone wiring and tap water among other activities are requested from the community.

**Step 3: Economic Sustainability**

Process 6: Financial assistance: At this stage, different entities interested in the project participate. Since ICT projects are costly, the main financial actor is generally the government. Nevertheless, operation and maintenance costs are generally covered by private actors including companies, foundations and others (see tables 3.3 and 3.4 for costs information).

**Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use**

Process 7: Training: This process is done after Step 3 has been accomplished. Here the CRFSD provides training to all the LINCOS’ coordinators involved in different ICT applications.

Process 8: Assimilation and use of LINCOS units: Once the previous steps are completed, LINCOS is put into operation by making use of the different available applications chosen according to community needs.

**Step 5: Monitoring aspects**

Process 9: Monitoring and Evaluation: Regular evaluations are performed to ensure objectives of the project match with the identified needs of the community. This facilitates better control over those activities that take place along the project’s operation.
4.4. Required resources for project implementation

As the financial process indicates, financial assistance must be requested to cover the required costs in order to implement the project. Table 4 provides an estimation of the base costs of LINCOS (initial fixed costs involved in the execution of a standard LINCOS unit).

Table 4. Base LINCOS costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Costs ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit construction</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of technologies (an average of 35 technologies</td>
<td>25 000-60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>such as equipment, labs, computer programs, material, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of the preliminary studies (RAP for the</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of training process (average of 6 one-month</td>
<td>20 000-50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>courses for 20 people)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of the unit transportation to the site and</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>customs duties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of installation</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate total cost</td>
<td>82,000 to 150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LINCOS project site [Retrieved from].

According to table 3.3, the base cost to execute a LINCOS project, on average, ranges from $82,000 to $150,000, depending mainly on the number of units installed, the location of these units, transportation, lodging and training of the program’s technicians, equipment and, most importantly, the number of applications involved (see Table 7, Appendix C).

In addition, there are some operational (variable) costs that must be considered. The most prominent operational costs are land rent/buy to install the unit, power supply costs, internet access, and unit coordinators’ salaries (see Table 5 for one unit costs).

Table 5. Other Operational Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Costs ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel in charge of LINCOS unit</td>
<td>13,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOS Operator</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant for laboratory and video Conference</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant for health, environment and Information</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land cost</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative Cost</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardens</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other maintenance costs</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitors</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexpected 5%</td>
<td>2,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRFSD 2000 [internal file - estimation for one community].

Because of the high costs involved, CRFSD has mobilized various national and international actors to finance each LINCOS project. There are academic alliances such as those with the Media Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Rochester School of Medicine’s Center for Future Health, the Harvard Center for International Development, INCAE, Universidad de Costa Rica -the University of Costa Rica-, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica -the National University of Costa Rica and the Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica -Costa Rican Institute of Technology (ITCR)- among others. In addition, there is also the contribution of different national and international companies and corporations, which form part of the project’s strategic partners. To identify some of them, we can mention the Hewlett Packard Corp., Microsoft Corporation, Alcatel, Motorola Co. and Banco Nacional de Costa Rica –National Bank of Costa Rica-. There is also assistance from the national government as which is an important actor and
provides the physical infrastructure that a community requires for the implementation of technologies. Lastly, the contributions of some international foundations as the Discovery Channel Global Education Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Costa Rica – United States of America (CR-USA) Foundation for cooperation, the AVINA Foundation and the Flora Family Foundation are part of this project (LINCOS, 2004).

These actors/project-supporters participate in different ways and their contributions depend mainly on the type of application that the project is introducing. It should also be noted that not all the actors mentioned above are necessarily involved in a particular LINCOS project and that a donor contributing in one community or specific country may not be part of another.

4.5. Selecting the main actors from the project

The participation of actors depends on the specificities of each step and the processes required by those steps. Although every actor plays an important role, in this paper we concentrate on those who have either provided significant academic assistance or a substantial financial contribution to the project and can significantly influence in some way the course of the project.

To justify the selection of certain actors from the project, an evaluation of their contributions to LINCOS is presented below. First, a summary of these actors participating in each step (refer to steps and process in section 2) is provided in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Actors Involved</th>
<th>Contributions: In-kind; Financial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction of the Project</td>
<td>Center for Future Health at Rochester University and MIT</td>
<td>Rochester University: RAP designs and faculty advisory for this component. MIT: Development and use of Constructionist Methodology. Participation of master and PhD level students in the development of applications/technologies for communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Construction and Installation</td>
<td>MIT, ITCR</td>
<td>MIT and ITCR with canopy designs and container’ platforms construction. Computer (hardware/software) selection / approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Economic Sustainability</td>
<td>CR-USA, BNCR, Discovery and State</td>
<td>CR-USA: Financial assistance for computers’ acquisition and others devices for the introduction of the first LINCOS second-generation concept in Rio Frío community. BNCR: Funds requested for services’ provision. Discovery Channel: Videos provision subsidies. State: Dominican Republic Government provided the funds for their 18 LINCOS units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Training, Assimilation and Use</td>
<td>INCAE</td>
<td>INCAE: Together with CRFSD, training courses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own construction by using the information presented in reports, Internet and other related sources to the project.

4.5.1. Donors descriptions

After above selection, a description of the main donors is offered to give a better idea of their objectives or mission.

*From academic Institutions:*

**The Technological Institute of Costa Rica (ITCR):** ITCR is a Costa Rican public institution of higher education in technology. It was established in 1971, becoming the first technological university in Central America. Its mission is ‘to launch strategic actions to consolidate its national and regional leadership in the fields of technological education, innovation policies, and transfer of technology focusing on productive sectors, regional projection, and potential international cooperation’ (ITCR 2004). ITCR became LINCOS strategic ‘partner’ a few months later after the CRFSD initiated the idea in 1998.

**The Central America Institute of Business Administration (INCAE):** In 1964, the business community and the governments of the Central America founded INCAE. It is a private, non-profit, multinational, higher education organization devoted to teaching and research endeavors in the fields of business and economics.
aimed at training and instructing from a worldwide perspective. Its mission is ‘to actively promote the comprehensive development of the countries served, enhancing leadership skills within the key sector by improving management practices, attitudes, and values’ (INCAE, 2004). INCAE has been working with LINCOS since 2000 by given technical and monitoring assistance. Thus, INCAE provides in-kind services to CRFSD instead of providing direct financial assistance. For example, master and doctoral students from INCAE come to CRFSD installations to carry out evaluations that in most cases are part of their research papers.

The Media Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): The MIT Media Lab is both an academic department and a research laboratory and operations started in 1985. The research program is funded by over 300 of the world’s largest companies, with a total volume of almost $30 million per year (LINCOS 2003 [internal file]). The focus of this research has historically been human-machine systems, and now explicitly includes a strong research agenda for sustainable development. The Media Lab is a ‘co-founder’ of the LINCOS project.

The Center for Future Health at the Rochester University: The center for future health is a collaborative effort of the School of Medicine at the University of Rochester and the MIT Media laboratory (Rochester University, 2004). It is dedicated to the creation of a system of intelligent devices that can be used worldwide and will enable people to monitor changes in their own health and compensate for physical limitations. The center conducts research in a problem-centered and interdisciplinary way in order to achieve personal health technology goals. The idea is that this allows progress to be made in areas where solutions require such disparate expertise that standard research approaches fail. Its objective is ‘to provide a platform of inter-operability on which to develop a large array of health devices for personal use, permitting their clinical testing and then allowing rapid transfer to industry’ (Rochester 2004). The center has joined the LINCOS project in collaboration with the University of Rochester and MIT since year 1999, one year after the project started.

From Companies/Corporations

The National Bank of Costa Rica: As a public bank, its mission is ‘to become the country’s financial partner by provision of secure and excellent services’ (BNCR, 2004). The bank emphasizes activities where it has a clear competitive advantage. BNCR was ‘invited’ to become a donor of LINCOS by helping with their funds to meet its operational costs in LINCOS, San Marcos de Tarrazú. This contribution was to be mainly for the implementation of Discovery Channel videos.

From International Cooperation Agencies/Foundations

Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership: Discovery channel recently – April, 2004- changed its name replacing “foundation” with “partnership”, thus becoming Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership (DCGEP). According to them, ‘the latter word more accurately states the nature of the organization’ (Discovery Channel, 2004). This is a non governmental organization, a public, non-profit entity that works with partners and donors to bring to scale a grassroots education project in order to make positive difference in under-served communities around the world (ibid).

DCGEP is dedicated “to reaching across the global information divide with the tools and training necessary to extend the power of ICTs to under-resourced communities around the world”. Its goal is “to bring empowering benefits of technology to 1 million children and their communities by the end of 2005” (ibid.). Currently, DCGEP participation with LINCOS -in some communities- is about providing videos support.

The Costa Rica–United States of America Foundation (CR-USA): CR-USA is an innovative bi-national mechanism for international cooperation established in 1996 and based in Costs Rica. It is a private, non-profit and independent organization that manages an endowment of $56 million US dollar, whose purpose is to promote cooperation between the two countries, within the framework of
sustainable development by supporting projects in technical cooperation, technological transfer and capacity building. Its mission is ‘to promote, encourage and develop the broadest cooperation in all fields of human activity between the peoples and government of Costa Rica and the United States of America, through the exchange of ideas, specialized assistance and technical support, to carry out and improve policies and programs that tend toward sustainable development and the mutual and general benefit of both countries’ (CR-USA Report 2002:2). CR-USA directs its resources to private and government non-profit organizations whose goals are in agreement with CR-USA’s requirements. According to CR-USA (2004), these organizations have to prove their contribution towards an improvement in the national population’s social and individual way of life. CR-USA’s ties with the CRFSD began in 2002, when they approved $106,618 funds for the establishment of a LINCOS second-generation unit in one rural community – Rio Frio de Sarapiquí - of the country.

Community MBO Description: Besides the actors indicated above, the project also needs the participation of the local community for project integration. Each community will need to join together to form a local administration or MBO that directly and responsibly manages the project with the assistance of the coordinators from each LINCOS’ application. This MBO and the applications’ coordinators are represented in figure 3.

The MBO is the entity locally responsible for the personnel in charge of each LINCOS application. Their objective is to delegate functions to the coordinators and to control their performance. These coordinators are chosen by the MBO to meet the necessities of the community. They are supposed to be a small group (maximum 4) whose task is to guide the use of technology and to provide maintenance of the equipment.

In conclusion, there are requirements and responsibilities that need to be accomplished between the different actors and the CRFSD. This set of requirements and responsibilities might be creating personal ties between the actors involved. These interactions can be characterized by a basic set of principal-agent relationships existing between the actors. For instance, there is a relationship between the CRFSD and its donors; similarly there is a relationship between the CRFSD and the MBO. Here, each of them represents different objectives that can be influenced according to the different relations of power exercised by each of them (it can be seen in terms of financial resources or in-kind assistance).

In the next section such relationships will be identified, analyzed and highlighted. The discussion will underscore how some these actors -across the different sectors (private enterprises, academic institutions, NGOs and State)- are interconnected, related to each other, or working together - be it structurally, through an individual, or through other common links.
5. Analysing Institutional Arrangements

“Principal-agent problem arises whenever one individual’s activities have an effect on other individual. The question arises under what circumstances do these interdependencies arise?” (Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz 1998: 967)

In this section an attempt is made to analyze the institutional arrangement of the LINCOS project, while taking account of the different steps and processes involved. Each process and step corresponds to a bilateral or multilateral relationship between various actors, which creates the circumstances for the principal-agent problems for LINCOS project.

5.1. NGO – donor relationship

This section will cover those steps and processes (i.e., introduction of the project; economic sustainability; and monitoring) that correspond to the NGO-Donors relationship. (See Figure 1, Appendix A, for the framework of the institutional arrangement).

Step 1: Introduction of the Project.

*The NGO and SNGO Relationship and Adverse Selection*: Staff of LINCOS and Rochester University in collaboration with the community performs the RAP. However in this step, community participation is generally in the form of basic provision of any required information to Rochester to do the assessment (income, work activities etc). There is no active participation in the sense that the community is involved with project objectives. They only become involved when the LINCOS container is in place and/or setup in the assigned area. Then, the community helps with the installation, land cleaning and construction of the required infrastructure such as toilets and storerooms. This implies that community involvement is for public works only and it does not directly take part in the RAP process itself. Late involvement of the community exposes the LINCOS project to problems that arise from adverse selection.

Another relevant issue is the time framework assigned for the community assessment before the project is implemented. This consists of 5 days where visits to 2-3 communities is necessary, and then an extra 2-3 weeks are used by Rochester personnel in their home country (the United States) to write up their findings. Afterwards, one member usually comes to Costa Rica to presents the results (Soruco, 2002b). Since the assessment results lead to the selection of communities and applications introduced by the project it should ideally represent community preferences through active community participation so that any community specific factors (heterogeneity, differences in age groups, gender sensitivity and cultural aspects) are taken into consideration. However, 5 days to visit 2-3 communities is definitely not enough time to be able to take into account complete indigenous characteristics of each community and to understand their needs. Furthermore, since Rochester is a medical institution, its emphasis is on health aspects (see chapter III, page 33 for details on Rochester University). This gives rise to case specific constraints about community assessments and the way they are performed. This particular issue has been realized by CRFSD, which concluded that “Rochester’s assistance by performing RAPs is over-emphasized in health aspects and other important elements from the community generally being ignored” (CRFSDa [internal file] 2002). However, this implication/recommendation has still not lead CFRSD or Rochester to change their methodology for RAP assessment and they are still performed in a similar manner to that explained above. This assessment procedure increases the risk of ‘adverse selection’ and is a clear constraint since there is not enough time to accomplish the project-desired outcomes where… “each community will have access to only those applications that are seen feasible for them, enabling every LINCOS project to
have its distinct features depending on the community requirement” (extracted from chapter III, page 27).

**Personal Interests:** Here the question arises as to why, in the first place, community assessments are performed by Rochester which is primarily a medical university and why the time frame for the field survey is a mere five days? After looking at different scenarios, a possible answer is that there are personal links between CFRSD and Rochester. Alex Petland (director of the Media Lab at MIT) and co-founder of the LINCOS project took on board Rochester Center for Future Health because he is also its co-founder, which meant that it became CFRSD’s new “partner” after its inception. This contradicts the official line of CFRSD apropos LINCOS and its donor selection. According to Dr. Juan Barrios Arce (CRFSD executive director), the most important point in the case of LINCOS is to find out where and how the project will be implemented in a manner that it...“helps to understand the community needs, therefore implementation costs to than, start looking for the right donors” (email, June16th, 2004). However, it seems that some actors are chosen not because they are relevant to the project but because of personal links, thus ‘becoming contractors’ agents instead of independent actors...in need of resources (chapter II, page 14). This arrangement between actors fails to reflect the needs of communities, by making LINCOS more ‘accountable to its donors than its beneficiaries’ (Thomas and Allen, chapter II, page 15).

Secondly, this five days time could be to reduce costs, since the project has to pay Rochester personnel for the duration of their field visits to the community. A shorter time in the field means lower costs. Any such costs are not likely to be covered by donors other than Rochester or CFRSD itself because Rochester personnel generally charge high prices for their field visits (see chapter III, table 3.3 for details). In other words, the time span of 5 days does not reflect the time period required to analyze and assess community needs but budget constraints faced by the project. Thus, this time limitations can also reflect reasons for communities’ failures (there are illustrative examples that can reveal some of these failures and they will be addressed in later sections). A proper time framework should be arranged: each community needs different periods of time since they are heterogeneous and culture shocks and changes will influence project results.

**Step 4: Economic Sustainability**

In this step, the paper identifies certain factors affecting the economic sustainability of the project.

**Time Constraints:** As discussed earlier, CRFSD presents itself as an entity that ‘does not provide funds/ subsidies to communities interested in the project. Instead it works as an intermediary actor providing information about potential donors or by handing over community financial requests to identified donors (i.e., GSOs). However, the funds requested from donors (by the community or through CRFSD itself) are asked for a period of 1-2 years. CRFSD sees this as the time necessary for the project to take off - for communities to begin project ownership and for it to become financially self-sustaining.

However, there is evidence to suggest that this is not sufficient for a LINCOS project to become self-sustainable. One example is the case of San Marcos community where a LINCOS project started in 1999 - more than four years ago - and they are still having problems with both fixed and variables costs (see the base costs in table 3.3 from chapter III) that the community was expected to have begun covering two years ago. Some LINCOS MBO members of the community have had to take care of some of them by using their own personal financial resources. For example, Don Rodrigo Jimenez Roble (community leader and member of the LINCOS MBO) had on several occasions paid the salaries of the LINCOS community coordinators.

What this reflects is that LINCOS sell-services failed to cover many of the expected costs from the project. CRFSD provided one million colones financial assistance to help with these costs and to pay back the debt acquired so far with Mr. Jimenez. However, CRFSD simultaneously pointed out that they are generally
not responsible for the bail out and they are also not responsible if the project has failed to sell their services (CRFSD [letter sent by CRFSD to Mr. Jimenez Company (Coopesantos) June 2003). This shows that on the one hand CRFSD wants to put pressure on the community that they should not depend on it but make the project self sustaining, and on the other hand it recognizes that the project has yet to realize its objectives and is still dependent on external finance to sustain itself. Additionally, any provision of funds is also in contradiction to CRFSD’s own commitments to the project as it clearly advocates that it does not financially sponsor any LINCOS units, but instead only assists by redirecting community applications to appropriate financing sources (LINCOS, 2004).

Here the point which arises is why there is a time limit of at most two years for the financing of a LINCOS project? One probable answer is that donors often give funds for short-periods since in the long run they expect the project to be sustainable (from chapter II. page 19). This is the case with the LINCOS project. However, a two years time limit for it to become self-sustainable by charging for its services is unrealistic and not practical since the project is usually targeting one of the poorest communities in poorest marginal and rural areas who generally cannot afford to finance any social services. For example, on average, the most common cause for non-attendance for the population in rural Costa Rica is that they simply cannot pay for it (see graph 1, chapter I). Such communities need more time than 2 years to become sufficiently developed to be able to pay for the services offered to them. Since the commitment of any donor is not more than 2 years towards LINCOS project, it appears that LINCOS is facing sustainability problems, whereas in reality it is the time limit of 2 years by CRSFD, which is unfair and unrealistic.

**Personal Interests and Moral Hazard:** CRFSD has also involved actors who have no direct link with the LINCOS project per se, such that the association between these actors is independent of LINCOS objectives. For example, Discovery Channel has been providing videos made by Discovery about various geographical phenomenon (i.e., volcanoes) to improve general awareness among the public. However, Discovery has charged CRFSD for the provision of these videos, which is financed by involving another actor BNCR (the National Bank of Costa Rica). This is a NNGO- SNGO relationship. According to Juan Barrios, the reason Discovery and CRFSD got involved with each other was because they were both interested in the branding of their respective products (Email: September 2004). On the one hand, Discovery is being branded in Costa Rica as providing its documentary videos to LINCOS projects, and CRFSD is being branded internationally by getting an international media actor on board. Hulme and Edwards work (1997) in chapter II states that such relationships between actors are about “accessing ‘foreign markets’ and would make a perfect case for moral hazard as far as LINCOS project is concerned.

To know whether the personal interests between CRFSD and Discovery have led to moral hazard, let us see if LINCOS has anything to gain from this arrangement. The answer is ‘not much’, as Discovery is charging on average amount of $14,000 for 2 years’ video provisions to a single-community and the theme of most of these videos is not relevant to those communities. For this video provision payment, CRFSD has asked for funds from other partners –BNCR-. When CRFSD asked BNCR to become a partner by financing Discovery assistance, some issues were accorded. According to the contract agreement, if BNCR joins the project by financing these videos, it will benefit from the relationship by getting the approval not only to name Discovery as one of its partners but also by showing the development assistance they have provided to a community. If they want it, BNCR will also have a designed link to their site in the Discovery web page. These are incentives provided by Discovery through CRFSD. These relationships (CRFSD and BNCR) also include monthly project reports being sent to BNCR by CRFSD.

Here one can clearly see that the interests of the actors involved are not associated with the LINCOS project objectives, and that these various actors carry their own agendas. In this scenario, the sustainability of a LINCOS project and its effectiveness towards the development and welfare of community can easily be questioned.

The NGO - SNGO Relationship and Moral Hazard: There is another issue that is worth analyzing here, and that is the case of the ‘new’ LINCOS approach, since it changed to LINCOS second generation. As already noted in chapter III, this approach was initiated in 2002, with the idea of introducing the latest technologies in the LINCOS units. This ‘new’ phase consists of putting together different perceptions from the project and changes in the applications provided by LINCOS, by making use of the attained insights from previous experiences. Moreover, its focus is now more on the ‘Communities’ Sustainable Development, leaving apart the ‘old’ concept of ‘Hardware’- just computers or technology per se- by concentrating on people and their problems while promoting Sustainable Development’ (Chapter III pages 24-25). LINCOS second generation, as CRFSD’s executive director Dr. Juan Barrios Arce defines it, ‘became a project that can now be placed according to communities’ request by using: a community center, school and not necessarily the recyclable containers [as original idea was about] in an effort to focus mainly on community and educational aspects (extracted from chapter III, page 25) making LINCOS suitable for every community’s needs.

The LINCOS second-generation idea started by ‘bringing’ the project to the Rio Frio community, where funds used for this initiative were asked and provided by the CR-USA Foundation. Looking closely at the Rio Frio LINCOS project, it seems that one of the important reasons for switching to LINCOS second-generation while focusing it on sustainable development of communities is that CRFSD wants to fall in the CR-USA’s general agenda. CR-USA is the only financial donor for the first ever second generation LINCOS project. For example, according to Juan Barrios, sustainable development is now an issue that needs to be part of every LINCOS. As he states in his own words “LINCOS Rio Frio became the first second-generation unit, where the telecenter concept moved apart, putting 100% emphasis on human sustainable development” (email, June 6th, 2004).

Notwithstanding this rhetoric, in reality, LINCOS project in Rio Frio fails to incorporate the changes which were pre-requisite for a standard second-generation LINCOS project. Whereas in the first place these changes were brought into the proposed second generation LINCOS model to align LINCOS with the objectives of CR-USA’s. For example, the model second generation LINCOS proposes options other than the ‘containers’ since they require high operational costs to be incurred by the community and have thus been identified as a major constraint on sustainable development among communities.

The second generation LINCOS proposes public buildings instead of containers. These community buildings can be schools, community centers etc. However, it has been noted that containers are still being used in second-generation projects even where there is access to public buildings. For example, the Rio Frio community has recently received a second-generation LINCOS project in container form despite the fact that it has several public buildings available (i.e., 7 preschools, 60 schools, 3 colleges and 1 special center) (CRFSD, [internal file on regions information] 2003).

So the question arises as to why CRFSD still prefers to install containers instead of utilizing public facilities despite high costs that are associated with them. According to CRFSD “this container box and its size were selected because of its convenience, security, and portability… by minimizing the environmental impact and benefitting communities where it gets permanently installed” (extracted from chapter III, page 25).

Notwithstanding the CFRSD official justification for installing containers, the real justification might lie somewhere else. It has been observed that CRFSD’ general director and founder, Jose Maria Figueres Olsen (a former Costa Rican
president) is the owner of the used containers in this project. During Mr. Figueres administration (1994-1998), Costa Rica faced an important change in the way its major export commodity (bananas) was transported. Earlier, bananas had been transported by train, whereas now they are transported in large containers through trailers. Mr. Figueres’ family is among few who were the owners of some of the companies that are given this new transport services, not just nationally in the country but to different countries in Latin America (Dunkerley, 1998: 589-655). Today, Jose Maria Figueres is also the owner of a shipping company called Melones de Entebbe - Entebbe Watermelons Co.- that exports melons to outside Costa Rica by also using these trailers (CRFSD [internal file] 2000). This example provides a good explanation why containers are used in LINCOS and in LINCOS second-generation despite the fact that it is costly. And besides, the CRSFD claim that containers are environmentally friendly can easily be denied as the alternatives appear better options environmentally and economically: they are cheaper and it is environmentally more effective to utilize vacant public buildings than to bring and install a container.

So now the question arises as to whether the claims by CRFSD to put emphasis on sustainable development in second generation LINCOS was only to justify the funds channeled from CR-USA. Another question is why CR-USA has failed to notice this deliberate violation of project objectives by CRFSD in implementing second-generation LINCOS project at Rio Frio. Both these questions suggest that the relationship between CRFSD and CR-USA might have suffered from moral hazard.

To unpack these questions, the paper investigates whether there are hidden interests among the actors involved. The founding trustee of CR-USA for Costa Rica, is Lic. Carmen Maria Valverde Acosta who has a close relationship with Jose Maria Figueres. Ms. Valverde was a member of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly during Jose Maria Figueres administration (1994-1998) and also served as its Legislative Assembly vice president from 1995-1996. At the time that this study took place, she was not only the president of the Foundation namely ‘the Cultural and Historical Center’ created by the father of José Maria Figueres but also a member of the Board of Directors of the CRFSD-LINCOS project. Additionally she, along with Jose Maria Figueres, has been a consultant on new ICTs (La Nación, 2004). Such relations between the main actors of CRFSD and CR-USA have evidently led to moral hazard.

**Step 6: Monitoring and Evaluation**

In this step, the prominent actor is INCAE with their in-kind contributions to LINCOS. INCAE provides its ‘assistance’ to LINCOS by supplying students that come to perform monitoring and evaluations from the project.

**Personal Interests and Adverse Selection:** Here, both CRFSD and INCAE can be seen as agents that are benefiting from what could be called ‘mutual alliances’: CRFSD gets INCAE students as interns who work for LINCOS, and INCAE is assured of a place where students can perform their research. However, one has to ask if the ‘partnership’ between CRFSD and INCAE is relevant for LINCOS.

The interns from INCAE are primarily responsible for working out various proposals advising LINCOS on how to get donors (Soruco 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). As a result, CRFSD has several proposals for each LINCOS project where each proposal tries to target a certain donor by focusing on its specific area of interest. For example, any LINCOS proposal for CR-USA would highlight the issue of sustainable development because CR-USA works mainly in that area. In short, when INCAE representatives are presenting CRFSD with different proposals, they are more interested on ‘matching’ donors’ objectives than those of the LINCOS project, thus creating the situation mentioned by Thomas and Allen that ‘NGOs are in practice more accountable to their donors than they are to the beneficiaries’ (chapter II, page 17). This evidently creates a problem of adverse selection. I will now discuss how the INCAE and CRFSD arrangement has made the LINCOS project prone to adverse selection.

INCAE is a well-known Costa Rican academic institution that became part of the Digital Nations Consortium of the Media Lab from MIT. INCAE major interest in LINCOS is about knowing the impact that this project has on communities. INCAE started an analysis in San Marcos Community with the assistance of Angela Casper, who is an INCAE business administration master student. This evaluation involved a one-month (June, 2002) community assessment. This evaluation is now used as a standard model of the LINCOS project called Historias Existentas (Successful Histories), and is attached to most proposals to target donors, showing them community impacts of a standard LINCOS project (Soruco 2002a). However, I have screened this evaluation report and it turns out that it contacted only 3 people from San Marcos community, which include a woman, a child and a member of the LINCOS community MBO - Rodrigo Jimenez - (CRFSD [file from INCAE] 2002).

Today, CRFSD is using this evaluation report and assumes it is applicable for all LINCOS communities (Soruco 2002a). This is in clear contrast with their claim that communities are unique entities, putting the success of any future LINCOS project at risk as any community selection and LINCOS project implementation based on this evaluation report would be prone to adverse selection. It is also important to mention here that, what might be seen as ‘mutual alliance’ between CRFSD and INCAE, is actually turning out to be a source of problems with the final project objectives. For example, for 2001, the total number of internships was 40, and in 2000 it was 60 (CRFSD, [internal file LINCOS second generation] 2003), which was a huge number and as Heeks & Baark suggest it may well be that ‘too many staff will have objectives that are too broad and shallow’ (Chapter II, page 15).

5.2. NGO - MBO relationship

In the CRFSD–MBO relationship (see appendix A, Figure 1), an administrative structure for the project is used. This is going to be analyzed by breaking up the chain to look at the CRFSD-MBO relationship. For this purpose, the respective steps of the LINCOS project will be analyzed.

Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use

The NGO – MBO Relationship and Adverse Selection: This step tends to involve cultural factors as major forces that can slow down a project impact if they are not taken into account. Therefore, communities can be facing (or going through) a process of adaptation that is different in every community, which sometimes takes longer periods to assimilate the uses of the project.

To exemplify some of the cultural problems faced by communities, one can start by looking at the case of Dominican Republic where people complain about facing problems in understanding how the LINCOS project can affect their lives. To this effect, the following email conversation is relevant. This took place between the CRFSD’ educational coordinator (Costa Rica) and the local personnel from LINCOS- Seibo (Dominican Republic).


lincos_seibo: le decia que cuando llego el formulario, parecia que era un documento de una direccion equivocada. [What I was telling you was that when the documentation from LINCOS Costa Rica came, it was like coming to a wrong direction...meaning, not one knew what to do with it]

lincos_educacion: por qué [why, what do you mean?]

lincos_seibo: a lo que me refiero es que hay un problema educativo tan tan grande aqui, que los muchachos reciben (en este caso los mediadores) una capacitacion, pero en realidad para ellos eso es bla bla (le termino la idea?). [Here, we have a very serious cultural problem in relation with educational aspects. People (meaning LINCOS personnel in Seibo-Dominican Republic) are receiving training that they perceive as useless, because nothing is making sense, it is like someone talking a different language... Do you know what I mean? Should I say more?]
The email conversation indicates the problems communities face, when such aspects are not taken into account. Similarly, when looking at the case of San Marcos LINCOS project, LINCOS personnel expressed their feelings about the irrelevance of services and the poor quality of the project. This was the case with some of the health and environment applications that were not in use at all, since the community did not know how to use them and did not consider them useful tools for their daily file. The community at San Marcos also felt that they have been asked for too much by the LINCOS project and they were not prepared to deal with it and felt overwhelmed. Additionally, another problem that can make the case for adverse selection in the San Marcos project and that ought to be mentioned here is that in that particular project, LINCOS’ MBO meetings were few and when they took place, not all members were present, reflecting not much interest in the project by the community. This lack of interest made it difficult to propose solutions to overcome some problems such as the lack of money to pay LINCOS coordinators salaries - and there is evidence that salary problems generated other problems -. For example, local LINCOS coordinators were not performing their duties efficiently, which further exacerbated coordination problems among the personnel. Furthermore, in the absence of salary payments, coordinators felt no obligation to do their job or to act in response to any required task. This behavior fits Riddell and Robinson’s work (chapter II), which suggests that ‘well-trained field staff, motivated by a reasonable level of remuneration and committed to the goals of the organization, clearly play a critical role in successful interventions… Poorly paid staff have cause to be less committed to the projects they are managing or executing, and will be tempted to spend more project time engaged in moonlighting activities’ (extracted from chapter II p. 15). [evidence is not supporting the analysis]

Technological Constraints: Another problem is with the products and applications that LINCOS projects offer or introduce in communities. For example, in the case of Cutris Community, there were problems with Internet signals (either no signal at all or when available it was only for short periods. This was in most cases the reason for LINCOS services to be stopped. Sale of inputs, which rely on this application, was in many cases impossible. In Cutris, those Internet problems also created an environment in which LINCOS personnel wanted to resign since they had nothing to do. In San Marcos, this situation was quite serious and some of the LINCOS coordinators actually left the project because of such hitches. This was a great loss for LINCOS and CRFSD since they were from the community, had already acquired substantial capabilities working on the project, and their loss appeared to have significantly affected project progress (CRFSD [internal file] 2000).

There were also problems in LINCOS projects in the Dominican Republic (Bohechio region) where containers were closed in the evenings, and remain closed on weekends, which made LINCOS units less accessible to their respective
communities. Furthermore, a problem arose when LINCOS projects faced high costs because they had to buy electricity generators (which are both noisy and polluting) because of constant blackouts and power fluctuations in Dominican Republic (Shakeel, 2001). Therefore, high electricity costs also forced many LINCOS units to open only at daytime, thus excluding the working population who were usually free in the evening.

5.3. NGO - state Relationship

CRFSD executive Director, Dr. Juan Barrios points out in his own words for LINCOS project: “the best donor is the government, because initial costs are too high and basic infrastructure should be provided by government... then different enterprise [players] can assist with some maintenance and operational costs” (Email June 17th, 2004). But why then, is this not the case in Costa Rica. As indicated in chapter III, the LINCOS project only works with government support in the case of Dominican Republic.

Political Constraint and Moral Hazard: The reason the government is not involved with LINCOS initiatives in Costa Rica is because Jose Maria Figueres belongs to the political party (Partido Liberacion Nacional) that lost in the 1998 elections and the opposition party (Unidad Social Cristiana) has been governing the country since 1998-2002 and 2002-2006. As Farrington & Bebbington (1993) suggest, “if anything, State and NGOs are ‘reluctant’ partners” (chapter II, page 19), and the reluctance of the State to become a stakeholder in the initiative of the opposition is well justified. Thus, despite believing that the Costa Rican government is the best donor for LINCOS, CRFSD had to look somewhere else for money (for example CR-USA in Rio Frio) and was forced to provide financial assistance itself as in the case of San Marcos, despite proclaiming not to do that.

The situation in Dominican Republic is different. There, 18 LINCOS units have been installed with the assistance of the government. In this case there are no RAP performances since the government is the one choosing where the LINCOS units will be placed (in which communities) without using the services of Rochester personnel. In the Dominican Republic, LINCOS is working in areas that, according to Hulme and Edwards, are already identified by the state as those where such initiatives work well, designed to help the state target poverty alleviation goals and national economic development (chapter II pp.18-19). LINCOS in Dominican Republic also fits the arrangement mentioned by Anangwe (1995) where a GRO is allowed to work with a high degree of independence without threatening the state. In other words, it appears that the involvement of state is important to avoid the circumstances, which generally lead to principal-agent problems in the case of LINCOS project.

6. Conclusions

The paper finds out that the collaboration of CRFSD and Rochester foundation has proven to be ineffective because (a) the Rochester personnel, who were called in to help select the communities, face time constraint and suffer from unfamiliarity with the context even language problems (English instead of Spanish) (b) Rochester foundation, which has a health focus, is not equipped to carry out a RAP which can cover economic, social, technological, cultural, educational aspects of the project and could only focus on the health dimension. Thus any ‘partnership’ between CRFSD and Rochester is creating circumstances for adverse selection. Here the paper finds out that CRFSD and Rochester are partners because there are strong personal ties between the executive bodies of both organizations. The paper also suggests that LINCOS is also exposed to exogenous factor, which hampers its objectives. For example, there is time limit of 2 years after which LINCOS project is expected to be sustainable. The already implemented LINCOS projects (i.e., San Marcos and Cutris) suggest that 2 years is not enough because generally it takes a lot more time for the community to develop and finally...
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be able to pay for the services. However, this time limit has been the permanent feature of every LINCOS project because generally donors don’t provide finance for long-term projects. This exposed LINCOS to the problem of moral hazard.

The paper also finds out that CRFSD itself has suffered from moral hazard as it was able to get CR-USA on board by switching the emphasis of LINCOS projects on sustainable development by initiating LINCOS second generation. However in reality, the LINCOS projects (i.e., Rio Frio) followed same old methodologies which were part of the original LINCOS despite having a choice to follow a more environment friendly options of LINCOS second generation. For example, the second generation LINCOS projects still use containers despite the recent emphasis on using public buildings. The paper investigates the reason behind using containers and found out that the General Director and founder of CRFSD owns these containers and thus he is still emphasizing on container use despite it being a costly option to the project.

Another relationship between the actors that has lead to moral hazard is of CRFSD and Discovery who have entered into a partnership to brand themselves. There partnership hasn’t bring any good to LINCOS and if anything the costs of the project can risen up if CRFSD decides to buy Discovery videos for each LINCOS project which in many cases are irrelevant to the communities.

Moreover, the monitoring and evaluation stage of LINCOS project also create circumstances for principle-agent problems i.e., adverse selection. For example, the evaluation of LINCOS projects is done by INCAE under the supervision of CRFSD. However, it appears that both actors are partners out of convenience as CRFSD places INCAE students as interns in its organization. To date INCAE has only done two community assessments on San Marcos and Cutiris. For San Marcos, I had the access to the data, and it is found out that the community assessment is based on three people out of approximately 4000 people. Such community assessments are definitely not representatives of the community and tell little or virtually nothing about the success or failure of the project. Strangely enough, CRFSD claims that this evaluation report represents a standard LINCOS community and thus other LINCOS projects should be based on its recommendations. Clearly any such approach would expose LINCOS project to adverse selection. For example, a community member of LINCOS project working in Dominican Republic in Selbo has shown his dissatisfaction over LINCOS services and its relevance to the community needs. Similarly in Costa Rica the San Marcos and Cutiris communities present the same level of dissatisfaction over LINCOS project as they considered many health and environmental services/applications provided by the project as irrelevant. They claimed that they cannot relate to these services and are not equipped to utilize them. These examples clearly suggest that LINCOS project is exposed to adverse selection.

Furthermore, in Costa Rica the LINCOS project faced political constraint as the founder of CRFSD belongs to the opposition. This lead to the minimum participation by the current Costa Rican government in LINCOS projects which forced CRFSD to find out donors and partners in the private sector or from international market. This political constraint in the first place, exposed LINCOS projects to moral hazard as CRFSD looked for international donors i.e. Discovery case. Some technological constraints, which are inherent to developing countries, have further hampered the effectiveness of LINCOS projects.

Finally, the paper in detail identifies and investigates those circumstances, which lead to principle agent problems in LINCOS project. Here these circumstances risen due to time and technological constraints and personal interests/personal links between actors. Time and technological constraints are exogenous factors, which affects the intentions of the actors, whereas personal links and personal interests are somewhat endogenous to factors. In this scenario, the circumstances of principal agent problem doesn’t rise because of one actor but it is rather an outcome of the bilateral relationship or multilateral relationships between the actors involved in an ICT project.
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Well identification of these circumstances is an important step towards solving the principal agent problem, and making LINCOS project a more effective one. This paper takes this important step and would be of great insight for any body who wants to understand what are the inherent problems faced by a LINCOS project and how to solve for them or how to avoid them in an effort to make it a project which in reality works for the sustainable development of its communities.

Notes

1 Is a shorthand term used to describe the widening gap between those who have access to a computer and internet and those who do not (Microsoft Melinda Found, 2004).
2 There are different likes and dislikes for what an intermediary organization can be (Carroll, 1992:9) however, in the case of this paper, the meaning will be understand as those actors—who or not with a sense of social commitment—providing some source of support by channeling resources.
3 Indicating ways of negotiations among actors. For studies of these soft factors such as negotiation behaviors, see Schechter1998 and Solomon 1999).
4 Within this donors’ classification the paper will include: national and international foundations, private enterprises and academic institutions. Although, in this paper it is recognize the vast differences that prevail between bilateral organizations (northern foundations) and private enterprises, and between those and academic institutions. But, they are all are included within this classification since they are assisting the project by providing funds or in-kind resources that can be measured in terms of financial support. Therefore, they become more aid agencies [donors] rather than partners [as some of them may be considered by CRFSD]. Lastly, for the analysis purpose, the State will be seen as a separate actor, not included within this donor’s classification.
5 The difference between state and government is well known however for the present paper the two terms are used interchangeably. This CRFSD-State relationship is only about how it works when project involves the State directly by ‘purchasing’ the project idea.
6 See chapter II for detailed explanation of Principal-Agent theory.
7 “Providing a service is just the starting point in a chain of events that should ultimately end in an increase in the well-being of users” (Carroll, 1992:63) whereas this increase in the well-being can’t only be attributed in terms of income.
8 “Accountability is understood as the degree to which members (or citizens) can hold their leaders (or politicians, bureaucrats etc) responsible for their actions” (Biekart, 1999:305). However, it is important to mention that this accountability debate depends merely on the definition given to NGOs (Biekart, 1999:38).
9 ‘New Policy Agenda’ is term coined by Robinson (1993) whose beliefs are based on neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic theory (Hulme & Edwards 1997).
10 “The Telecentres consist of a physical infrastructure that allows the access to the information and communication services by connectivity” (Gómez et al., quoted in There are different types of telecenters, one of those are the multipurpose ones as LINCOS, which can provide a wide range of applications (ranging from telephony to internet connectivity) for individual, social and economic development. It is important to acknowledge that according to CRFSD, LINCOS differs from telecenters in some aspects, but for the purpose of this paper LINCOS is going to be assessed as a telecenter to facilitate the understanding of its concept.
12 San Marcos de Tarrazú community (Southern Region-Rural), 2000.
13 San Joaquin de Cutris, San Carlos (Northern Region- Rural), 2001.
15 This capacity is set as a reference by CRFSD as result of LINCOS historical information in communities of similar size.
16 It is a feasibility procedure for community assessments, implemented in LINCOS by Rochester University. According to Rochester, Rapid Assessment procedures are anthropologically based methods –ethnographic interviews, focus groups, and particular observations – which elicit descriptive information of a cultural context (LINCOSb [internal file] 1999).
17 There is also the case that units can be installed outside the home country as it has been done in Dominican Republic. Therefore, they get changed if units are installed locally or internationally.
18 It is important to note that the classification of actors presented in this table was the reality at the time of writing this paper. It is possible that positions may have shifted from what they were in the past, or may change in the future, such that the actors may find they are misrepresented at a later time.
19 Proposed by MIT and it suggests that users construct—with available computer tools—meaningful products and knowledge in order to guarantee long lasting effects in the learning process.
20 The funds were 38,366,450 colones, which represents $106,617.81 (at the average exchange rate according to the Central Bank for the calendar 2002 -359.85 / US$1-). See CR-USA web site for details on this at www.CR-USA.org

In 2003, there was an accumulated debt by LINCOS MBO to Rodrigo Jimenez of around 1 to 1.5 million colones = $ 3000US (CRFSD [internal file-b] 2003).

CR-USA mayor focus is on sustainable development, which to them it is the ‘only process capable of satisfying the needs of present and future generations without compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy theirs’ (CR-USA’s Report 2002: 2) which consequently came also the approach used by CRFSD.

Detailed explanation about these steps and its processes is giving in chapter III.
Appendices

Appendix A:

Figure 1: Actors and Steps forming the Chain

Source: Adapted by the author from the analysis “Stakeholders and aid flows in multiple aid chains” by Kees Biekart.

In short, the chain of this ICT project and its institutional arrangement involves different steps and within those steps many different processes are applied. In an attempt to summarize those steps, they would include the following phases:

Step 1: Introduction of the project.
Step 2: Construction and Installation.
Step 3: Economic Sustainability.
Step 4: Training, Assimilation and Use.
Step 5: Monitoring Aspects.
Appendix C: Applications

Since LINCOS units are equipped with a group of multifunctional applications they are selected for each community according to the recommendations of the assessment report. Each of these available applications is briefly described with its services and objectives as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health and Environment</td>
<td>Telemedicine, clinical and water analysis, forestry and soil analysis.</td>
<td>To promote a healthy environment in communities, with the assistance of the local health systems and the communities. This by making use of technological transfer as a tool to maximize communities’ potential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Community life</td>
<td>Constructionist method implementation.</td>
<td>To enable empowerment in disadvantage communities through processes of constructionist’s use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Communication Technologies</td>
<td>Videoconference component to bring long distance education through pre-recorded videos or closed circuit TV programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Communication Technologies</td>
<td>Information lab equipped with computers connected to the Internet, telephones and other services.</td>
<td>To apply the use of new technologies to universalize the LINCOS services in communities as a tool for local development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Infrastructure</td>
<td>Two options: LINCOS Platform or any other physical place provided by the State.</td>
<td>To design and construct new applications and spaces for the LINCOS communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business platform</td>
<td>E-commerce, fax services and others commercial services.</td>
<td>To arrange sustainable alternatives for LINCOS units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Information obtained from LINCOS [internal file] and LINCOS web site.
References


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